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Organ Donation in the United States: Can 
We Learn From Successes Abroad? 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite tremendous advances in the field of organ transplantation 
that have occurred in the United States and around the world 
during the past fifty years, organ donation policies have been unable 
to procure enough organs for those awaiting transplants. Currently, 
there are almost 34,000 Americans awaiting organs for transplants.! 
It is estimated that every twenty minutes, a new name is added to 
the national organ waiting list.2 In 1992 alone, more than 2,560 
patients died while waiting for an organ to become available.3 This 
1 United Network For Organ Sharing, Numbers of Patient Registrations on the National 
Waitlist, By Organ (1992) [hereinafter UNOS Waitlist]. As of February 2, 1994 the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) reported 33,728 registrations for organ transplants on 
its waiting list. Statistic obtained from telephone conversation with UNOS, Communications 
Department on 2/14/94. The number of people registered as awaiting transplants might be 
slightly higher than the number of actual patients in need of transplants, since some patients 
may be listed with more than one transplant center. See United Network for Organ Sharing, 
Facts About Transplantation in the United States (1992). 
2 United Network for Organ Sharing, Facts Everyone Should Know About Organ Donation 
and Transplantation (1992) [hereinafter UNOS Facts]. 
3 Reported deaths on the UNOS organ waiting list: 
1988: 1,537 
1989: 1,732 
1990: 2,077 
1991: 2,518 
1992: 2,567 
The year in which the death was reported may not necessarily be the year in which the death 
occurred. United Network for Organ Sharing, Organ Procurement Transplantation Network 
Annual Report, Table V, Reported Deaths on the Waiting List, fly Organ 1988, 1989, 1990 (1990). 
1991 and 1992 statistics obtained from telephone conversations with UNOS, Communications 
Department (on 2/10/93 and 2/14/94). 
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death toll stands, despite the fact that over 16,000 organ transplants 
were performed with high rates of success.4 
In the 1980s, the United States abandoned its system of encour-
aged voluntarism, a policy which placed the onus of donation solely 
on each citizen, and replaced it with systems of required request and 
routine inquiry. These latter systems require the health care industry 
to actively pursue organ donations. The effectiveness of these laws 
has not yet been conclusively determined. In recent years many 
foreign countries have instituted bold measures to reduce their 
organ shortages. They have abandoned their purely voluntary ap-
proaches to organ donation and have enacted presumed consent 
laws. These presumed consent systems place a burden only on indi-
viduals who are opposed to donating their organs at death. While 
the presumed consent systems differ in their scope, all of them have 
generated significant increases in organs procured. The apparent 
initial success these approaches have had in procuring organs 
abroad warrants consideration of such a plan for the United States. 
Part I of this Note traces the recent history of transplantations in 
the United States and examines the systems of encouraged volunta-
rism, required request, and presumed consent used in the United 
States, as well as presumed consent schemes implemented abroad. 
Part II examines the strengths and weaknesses of these systems. Part 
III proposes a plan to implement a modified system of presumed 
consent in the United States. 
4 Totals of All Organ Transplants Done in the United States: 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Total 
Transplants 
12,786 
13,474 
15,478 
16,048 
16,603 
18,077 
Deceased 
Donors 
10,965 
11,556 
13,353 
13,766 
14,033 
15,336 
Living 
Donors 
1,821 
1,918 
2,125 
2,282 
2,570 
2,741 
United Network For Organ Sharing, Number of Transplants Performed In the U.S. fry Organ, 
Year and Type of Donor (1992).1992 and 1993 statistics obtained from telephone conversation 
with UNOS, Communications Department on 2/14/94. 
5 This Note deals primarily with cadaveric organ donors and does not address the equally 
important issues regarding donation by live donors or uses for organs and tissues in genetic 
engineering. 
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I. APPROACHES: PAST AND PRESENT 
A. Transplantation History and Advances 
The first cadaveric kidney transplant was performed in the Soviet 
Union in 1936.6 In the United States, during the 1940s and '50s, 
there was a great deal of transplant experimentation performed by 
surgeons in the field. 7 These efforts paid off in 1954 when doctors 
in Boston performed the first successful long-term kidney transplant 
using a living donor. In the 1960s, doctors, using the advances made 
with respirators and heart-lung machines, were able to maintain vital 
biological functions artificially in brain dead patients.8 This technol-
ogy facilitated the preservation of organs that could be removed for 
transplantationY 
The 1960s hailed tremendous achievements in many categories of 
organ transplants. The first successful larynx transplant was per-
formed in Belgium in 1969.10 In 1967, Dr. Christiaan Barnard per-
formed the first successful heart transplant in South Mrica. ll Al-
though the patient died from double pneumonia only eighteen days 
later, Dr. Barnard's efforts were duplicated in the United States ten 
months later, resulting in the first long-term heart transplant survi-
vor.12 As of 1992, 85 percent of heart recipients survive at least one 
year after receiving a transplant.13 While only a few years ago heart 
transplant recipients were limited to those people with maximum 
ages of 45 to 50 years, it is now common to perform heart transplants 
on patients in their late 50s and early 60s and to see recipients out 
of bed, speaking and eating a mere thirty-six hours after receiving 
a new heart.14 
6 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Reevaluation, Jan. 15, 
1991, at 1, n.4 (unpublished manuscript, distributed at the National Kidney Foundation 
Consensus Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, Feb. 25-26, 1991). 
7 See id. 
S Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Costs of Success, The Hastings Report, 23, 23 
(Dec. 1983) [hereinafter Caplan, Costs]. 
9Id. 
10 RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY As PROPERTY, 20 (1981). 
II Id. 
12Id. The transplant recipient survived another eight years after the surgery. Id. 
13 See J.G. Turcotte, Supply, Demand and Ethics of Organ Procurement: The Medical Perspective, 
24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2140, 2140 (1992). 
14 See id. at 2141; see also SCOTT, supra note 10, at 21. 
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Today medical science has enabled doctors to perform transplants 
of many different organs, tissues, and glands.15 Much of the improve-
ment in transplant results must be attributed to improved tissue 
typing and the development, in the early 1980s, of drugs such as 
cyclosporine and CyA.16 Advances in technology have also increased 
the maximum periods for which an organ can be preserved before 
being transplanted into the recipient. 17 In addition, the increase in 
multiple organ and tissue donations from a single recipient has 
greatly helped procurement efforts.18 A single cadaveric donor can 
save the lives of four separate recipients, by donating his or her 
heart, both lungs, and liver, and can enhance the quality of life for 
five other recipients by donating his or her two kidneys, pancreas, 
and both corneas. Countless others can benefit from this same 
donor's bone, skin, and other tissues.19 
15 These transplantable parts include blood and blood vessels, bone, bone marrow, cartilage, 
corneas, fallopian tubes, fat, hair, hearts, heart-lung, inner-ears, kidneys, liver, lung, muscles, 
nerves, ovaries, skin, tendons, testicles, and a variety of glands (adrenal, pancreas, pituitary, 
thyroid, and parathyroid). See UNOS Facts, supra note 2; see also Erik S.Jaffe, "She's Got Bette 
Davis['sJ Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and 
Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528,530 (1990); see also SCOTT, supra note 10, at 19. 
16 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at n.5. Since the introduction of CyA, the one-year graft 
survival rates of cadaveric kidneys increased from 50% to 85%, and those of hearts and livers 
from 25% to 85% and 75% respectively. See Turcotte, supra note 13, at 2140. New surgical 
techniques for implanting a single lung have increased one-year patient survival rates for all 
isolated lung transplants (single and double) from 50% to 70% (before and after 1989). Id. 
Several new immunosuppressive agents currently undergoing clinical evaluation offer hope 
of further increasing patient survival and decreasing side effects of immunosuppressive ther-
apy: Cyclosporine G-probably less nephrotoxic than CyA; FK 506--effective in reversing 
rejection in liver transplantation; Rapamycin-similar to, but more potent than FK 506; 
Deoxyspergualin-may be effective against antibody-mediated rejection; Monoclonal antibod-
ies-several being assessed for clinical efficacy. Id. 
17 See UNOS Facts, supra note 2. 
Current possible preservation time for organs: 
Id. 
Heart 
Liver 
Kidney 
Heart-lung 
Lung 
Pancreas 
Corneas 
Bone Marrow 
Skin 
Bone 
4-6 hours 
8-24 hours 
48-72 hours 
4-6 hours 
Up to 12 hours 
8-24 hours 
7-10 days 
Up to 3 years 
5 years or more 
4 years or more 
18 See Turcotte, supra note 13, at 2141. In over 60% of the organ removal procedures 
performed, a kidney and at least one other organ is donated from a single donor. Id. 
19 See id. 
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Legislation encouraging the posthumous donation of organs is a 
relatively new concept. At common law, individuals were prohibited 
from mandating what was to be done with their body parts once they 
died. 20 This prohibition was premised on the fact that no one could 
have a property right in a dead body.21 The next-of-kin, however, did 
enjoy a "quasi-property right" in the decedent's body immediately 
after death.22 This right was based on the belief that all individuals 
deserved a decent burial and that the family could best protect the 
interests of the deceased in this regard.23 
This law remained basically unchanged until the late 1940s when 
the international medical community accepted the viability of cor-
neal transplants. 24 This recognition prompted legislatures to change 
pertinent laws in order to reduce the barriers to cadaveric organ do-
nation.25 In 1947, California's legislature passed session laws Chapter 
125 and Chapter 126 which granted citizens the legal right to make 
posthumous donations of their entire bodies, or specified parts of 
them, to hospitals, universities, or "similar institutions."26 These laws 
set no limits on the uses for which body parts could be utilized by 
these institutions. Thus, they implicitly permitted the removal of 
organs for transplantation.27 The laws protected the decedent by 
prohibiting his family from vetoing his wishes.28 The legislation also 
allowed the decedent to specifY his desires in a will or other written 
instrument.29 In 1957, these statutes were amended to include eye, 
artery, and blood banks as well as "other therapeutic services" as 
permissible recipients.3o In 1968, a further amendment elaborated 
procedures for tissue procurement.3) 
20 See Donald R. McNeil Jr., The Constitutionality oj "Presumed Consent" Jor Organ Donation, 
9 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'y 343, 344 (1989). 
21 See id.; see also Williams v. Williams holding that " ... there can be no property right in 
the dead body of a human being ... a man cannot by will dispose of his dead body. If there 
can be no property in a dead body, it is impossible that by will or any other instrument the 
body can be disposed of." 20 Ch. D. 659 (1881), cited in McNeil, supra note 20, at n.9. 
22 See McNeil, supra note 20, at 344. 
23 See id. 
24 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 66. In 1991, roughly 43,000 corneal transplants were per-
formed. Generally, these procedures result in restored vision in over 90% of the patients who 
undergo them. UNOS Facts, supra note 2. 
25 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 66. 
26 !d. at 66-67. 
27 [d. at 67. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
30 SCOTT, supra note 10, at 67. 
31 [d. 
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B. Encouraged Voluntarism 
With the first successful kidney transplant in 1954, and the grow-
ing success of transplant procedures during the late 1950s and 
1960s, it became clear that the existing legislation governing organ 
donation was insufficient to procure the number of organs needed 
to satisfY the demand.32 By the mid-1960s the majority of states had 
some legislation regarding organ and tissue removal, but these laws 
varied widely among states with regard to the following factors: who 
could authorize tissue removal and make gifts; who could receive 
such gifts; what the allowable uses were for donated parts; the for-
malities regarding the giving and revocation of gifts; and the degree 
of liability to which doctors acting in good faith were subject.33 In 
1965, the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws appointed a sub-
committee to study the issues concerning organ donation and make 
recommendations for a uniform law.34 A model law, called the U ni-
form Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), was approved in July 1968 at 
the National Conference of Commissioners, and soon after by the 
American Bar Association as well as the American Medical Associa-
tion. 35 Within five years the UAGA had been adopted in some form 
by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.36 
In its pure form, the UAGA provides that any person older than 
eighteen years can make a gift, effective upon death, of all and any 
part of her body. It further provides that when the deceased has not 
expressly made a gift or expressly objected to donation during her 
lifetime, the deceased's family members can make a gift of any or 
all parts of her body. 37 The UAGA restricts gift recipients to hospitals, 
doctors, medical and dental schools, universities, organ and tissue 
banks, and any specified individual in need of a transplant.38 It 
specifies that gifts of bodies or parts are only to be used for trans-
32 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 23. 
33 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 71. 
34 Id. at 70-71. 
35 Id. at 71. In 1987 the UAGA was amended in various respects. Several states have adopted 
the amendments in whole or in part. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, § 3, 8A U.L.A. (1987) 
[hereinafter 1987 UAGAl. 
36 See id. 
37The various family members are given the following priority for authorization: spouse, 
adult children, parents, adult siblings, guardians, any other person authorized or under 
obligation to dispose of the body. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3, 8A U.LA (1968) 
[hereinafter 1968 UAGAl. When the UAGA was amended in 1987, it added "a grandparent 
of the decedent" after siblings and eliminated the "any other person" designation. See Jaffe, 
supra note 15, at n.27; see also 1987 UAGA, supra note 35, § 3. 
38 1968 UAGA, supra note 37, § 3. 
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plants, therapy, research, education, and advancement of medical 
or dental science.39 Under the UAGA, gifts can be made by will, 
effective immediately upon death without waiting for probate, or by 
donor card, and can be revoked at any time.40 A donee can accept 
or reject a gift. The UAGA shields all persons acting in good faith, 
in accordance with its terms, from civil and criminalliability.41 
The UAGA eliminated the major inconsistencies among states and 
clarified and facilitated the consent process. 42 It recognized the right 
of next-of-kin to donate organs of individuals who had not expressed 
an unwillingness to do so, but it did require explicit authorization 
of either the deceased or the family.43 The UAGA also recognized 
the legal status of donor cards. 44 It did not, however, address the 
issue of sale of human body parts. The legality of such commerce 
was left to the discretion of the states.45 In addition, the UAGA dealt 
only with corpses, did not address the disposition or use of un-
claimed corpses, and did not attempt to regulate gifts of body parts 
by living donors.46 
The UAGA sought to protect and encourage the principles of 
voluntarism, express consent, and individual rights, while at the 
same time facilitating donation and eliminating the need to rely on 
purely voluntary action by a potential donor during his lifetimeY 
The concept of achieving both of these ideals simultaneously came 
to be known as "encouraged voluntarism."48 Although no familial 
consent was necessary if the deceased expressly agreed to donate 
before he died, in practice, physicians rarely proceeded with removal 
absent familial consent. Eventually this system proved insufficient to 
supply the number of organs needed by potential recipients. In the 
1980s, encouraged voluntarism was replaced with systems of re-
quired request which placed the burden of procuring organs not 
only on individual citizens but on medical professionals as well. 
39Id. 
40Id. § 4. 
41 See 1968 UAGA, supra note 37, § 7. 
42 See B.L. Sadler, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Different Perspective, 24 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2173, 2173 (1992). 
43 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 24; see also Jaffe, supra note 15, at 533. 
44 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 23-24. 
45 See generally 1968 UAGA, supra note 37; see also SCOTT, supra note 10, at 72; Jaffe, supra 
note 15, at 533 & n.29. The 1987 UAGA revision, however, does ban the sale of organs. See 
1987 UAGA, supra note 35, § 10. 
46 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 72. 
47 See Sadler, supra note 42, at 2173. 
48 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 23. 
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C. Required Request and Routine Inquiry 
Although it is often referred to by this one term, required request 
actually embodies two different approaches to organ procurement: 
"routine inquiry," whereby hospitals are simply required to inform 
the family of its opportunity to make an anatomical gift; and "re-
quired request," whereby hospitals are obligated to expressly ask the 
family to consent to donation.49 Early state laws on organ donation 
served as models for subsequent state legislation. There is a great 
deal of variation among required request and routine inquiry state 
laws.50 In recent years, the federal legislature has taken an increas-
ingly active role in promoting organ donation.51 These federal laws 
ensure cooperation with required request or routine inquiry ap-
proaches to donation by conditioning federal aid to hospitals on 
compliance with these approaches.52 
1. Federal Legislation 
One of the early federal efforts to examine the organ shortage in 
the United States led directly to increased support for a system of 
required request. In October 1984, Congress enacted the National 
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) to create a more comprehensive 
network of organ donors and recipients and to raise public aware-
ness of the need for human organs.53 NOTA established an organ 
procurement and transplant network, the United Network for Or-
gan Sharing (UNOS) to oversee a national registry of potential 
donors and a waiting list of recipients. 54 It prohibited commerce in 
human organs but provided financial assistance to organ procure-
ment agencies (OPAs).55 It also established a task force on organ 
transplantation, directed by the secretary of Health and Human 
Services, to examine and report on the medical, ethical, legal, eco-
nomic, and social barriers to organ donation.56 The Task Force 
report, published in 1986, advocated that state legislatures pass 
49 See Kathleen S. Andersen and Daniel M. Fox, Impact of Routine Inquiry Laws on Organ 
Donation, 7 Health Affairs 65, 66 (1988). 
50Id. at 67-68. 
51 See generally Daphne Sipes, Requesting Organ Donations: A New State Approach to Organ 
Transplants, 8 HEALTH LAW IN CAN. 39 (1987) [hereinafter Sipes, Approach]. 
52Id. at 40. 
53Id. at 39. 
54Id. 
5" Id. 
56 Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 39. 
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routine inquiry legislation.57 By this time several states had taken the 
initiative and already had enacted either required request or routine 
inquiry laws. 
2. State Legislation 
The theory behind required request proved to be appealing to 
the populace. In 1985, Oregon was the first state to pass required 
request legislation.58 New York and California followed suit that same 
year.59 By the end of the decade, forty-five states and the District of 
Columbia had passed some form of required request or routine 
inquiry legislation. 50 
Required request laws vary greatly from state to state.51 The strong-
est laws require hospitals to request donation and document the ap-
proval or refusal on the death certificate.52 The weaker laws merely 
require that hospitals develop protocols to ensure that families are 
apprised of their option to donate.53 State laws vary as to whether 
hospitals are required merely to inform of the option to donate, or 
actually request donation. The stricter laws mandate high degrees 
of hospital monitoring, protocol, and documentation and extensive 
involvement of state health departments.54 These laws generally per-
mit fewer exceptions to the requirements. State laws also vary as to 
the scope of immunity and penalties imposed for noncompliance.55 
a. Oregon and New York Models 
Two of the first states to pass required request legislation were 
Oregon and New York in 1985.55 These laws require hospital person-
nel, in the absence of contrary indication by the patient or its family, 
to request consent for organ donation from the potential donor's 
57Id. at 39-40. 
58 B.A. Virnig & A.L. Caplan, Required Request: What Difference Has It Made?, 24 TRANSPLAN-
TATION PROCEEDINGS 2155, 2155 (1992). 
59Id. 
60 See Daphne Sipes, Does It Matter Whether There is Public Policy for Presumed Consent in 
Organ Transplantation?, 12 WHITTIER L. REv. 505, 511 n.30 (1991) [hereinafter Sipes, Policy). 
61 See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 68. 
62 See Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155. See discussion regarding the New York and 
Oregon models infra part I.C.2.a. 
63Id. See discussion regarding the California model, infra part I.C.2.h. 
64 See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 68. 
65 See Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 47. 
66 See Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155. 
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family.67 The response to such a request must be recorded on the 
death certificate.68 The New York law further requires the state 
health department to set implementation regulations, and requires 
the hospital to submit a certificate of request along with the death 
certificate.69 
b. California Model 
The California statute mandates routine inquiry as opposed to 
required request.70 The hospital personnel are required to inform 
the family of the option to make an anatomical gift, rather than 
explicitly request that it do SO.71 The California statute does not 
require any involvement by the state health department, nor does it 
require that responses be recorded.72 The statute does require the 
hospital to notifY an OPA once consent is given, but not until then. 73 
c. Variations among States 
Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted some 
version of required request legislation-legislation which imposes 
an affirmative duty on hospitals or procurement agents to request 
donation, either from the patient upon admission to a hospital, or 
from the patient's family when death has occurred or is imminent.74 
Eighteen states have passed routine inquiry laws-imposing an affir-
67 See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 68. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. at 69. 
71 [d. 
72 Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 68-69. 
73 [d. at 69. 
74 Alabama-Ala. Code § 22-19-142 (1993); Alaska-Alaska Stat. § 13.50.014 (1993); Ari-
zona-Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-849 (1993); Arkansas-Ark. Code Ann. § 20-17-605 (1993); 
Colorado-Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-34-108.5 (1993); Florida-Fla. Stat. ch.732.922 (1992); Geor-
gia-Ga. Code Ann. § 44-5-143 (Michie 1993); Idaho-Idaho Code § 39-3406 (1993); Illi-
nois-Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.755, para. 60/2 (1993); Louisiana-La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:2354.4 
(West 1992); Maine-Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2910 (West 1993); Maryland-Md. Health-
General Code Ann. § 19-310 (1993); Michigan-Mich. Compo Laws § 333.10102a (1992); 
Missouri-Mo. Rev. Stat. § 194.233 (1992); Nevada-Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 451.577 (Michie 
1993); New Hampshire-N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 291-A:2-a (1993); NewYork-N.Y. Pub. Health 
Law § 4351 (Consol. 1993); North Dakota-N.D. Cent. Code § 23-06.2-05 (1993); Ohio-Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2108.021 (Baldwin 1993); Oklahoma-Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2214 (1994); 
Oregon-Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.268 (1991); Vermont-Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5241 (1993); 
Washington, D.C.-D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1509 (1993); West Virginia-W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-
19-4a (Michie 1993); Wisconsin-Wis. Stat. § 157.06 (1991-92); and Wyoming-Wyo. Stat. 
§ 35-5-114 (1993). 
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mative duty on hospitals and procurement agents to inform the 
patient or his family of the option to donate.75 Most of these laws 
fall squarely into one of the two categories. At least four states, 
however, have laws which combine aspects of both types of legisla-
tion, depending on whether the living patient is approached for 
consent, or his family is first approached after his death.76 Two states 
have laws which require the hospital or procurement agent to in-
quire whether the patient is or was a donor, but place no further 
duty to obtain consent or inform the patient or his family of the 
option to donate.77 Iowa has adopted the UAGA but has no specific 
state law governing the duty to obtain consent or inform of the 
option to donate. 78 
i. The Role of the Health Department 
Some states like Oregon and New York impose the responsibility 
of establishing implementation regulations on the state health de-
partment.79 Some states require the health department to establish 
rules that hospitals must follow in training the organ request staff. so 
75 California-Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7184 (Deering 1993); Connecticut-Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 19a-27ge (1992); Indiana-Ind. Code Ann. § 29-2-16-10 (Burns 1993); Kansas-Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 65-3218 (1992); Massachusetts-Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 113, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1993); 
Minnesota-Minn. Stat. § 525.9214 (1993); Montana-Mont. Code Ann. § 50-5-212 (1993); 
Nebraska-Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-4815 (1992); New Jersey-NJ. Stat. § 26:6-58.1 (1993); New 
Mexico-N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-6-10 (Michie 1993); North Carolina-N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-
412.1 (1993); Rhode Island-R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-18.6-5 (1993); South Carolina-S.C. Code 
Ann. § 44-43-930 (Law. Co-op. 1991); South Dakota-S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-26-47 
(1993); Tennessee-Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-30-110 (1993); Utah-Utah Code Ann. § 26-28-6 
(1993); Virginia-Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-127 (Michie 1993); and Washington-Wash. Rev. 
Code § 68.50.500 (1992). 
76 Delaware (routine inquiry from patient, required request from deceased's family) Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2721 (1993); Hawaii (routine inquiry from patient, required request from 
deceased's family) Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327-5 (1993); Pennsylvania (required request from pa-
tient, routine inquiry from deceased's family) 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8608 (1993); and Texas 
(required request "if it is unclear whether the decedent is or is not a donor," and routine 
inquiry "if the decedent is not a declared donor") Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. 
§§ 692.013-.014 (West 1993). 
77 Mississippi's law requires that the family be asked whether the deceased was a donor or 
if the family is a donor family, but places no further duty on the hospital, stating, "the family 
may be informed of the option to donate .... " (emphasis added). Miss. Code Ann. § 41-39-15 
(1993) as amended Vy 1993 Miss. Laws 423. Kentucky simply requires its hospitals to encourage 
organ donation and identity potential donors. The sole duty its law places on hospitals is to 
notity a federally-certified organ procurement organization of any potential availability of an 
organ. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.241 (Baldwin 1993). 
78 See Iowa Code § 142A (1993). 
79 Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 69. 
8°Id. 
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Other states mandate that the health department establish proce-
dures to facilitate coordination between hospitals and OPAs. Some 
states also allow the health department to establish the permissible 
exceptions to the request or inquiry requirements.81 
ii. Permissible Exceptions 
In almost all state statutes, hospital staff is exempt from the re-
quest or inquiry requirement if there is actual notice that the de-
ceased or his family has objected to donation.82 Other exceptions 
apply if the health department has deemed the hospital unable to 
comply with the requirement, or if the need for organs and tissues 
has been met.83 This latter exception protects the hospital from 
having to request organs for which there is no need. Some states 
waive request requirements when it is known that organ donation is 
contrary to the decedent's religious beliefs.84 At least one state, 
Connecticut, also considers the family's religious beliefs for this 
exception.85 Other states allow exceptions if the attending physician 
has "special and peculiar knowledge of the decedent and/or the 
circumstances surrounding the death of the patient."86 Further ex-
ceptions may waive requirements when approaching the family 
members would cause them undue emotional stress, the organ 
would not be medically suitable, or there is a valid, previously signed 
donor card.87 
iii. Immunity and Penalties 
Immunity granted under the state statutes varies as well. Some 
states' required request statutes are silent on the immunity issue, 
relying on the UAGA's immunity clause which applies to any person 
acting in good faith. 88 Other statutes grant immunity for any person, 
while some grant immunity only for hospitals or physicians. Some 
81Id. 
82Id. at 70. 
83 Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 69. 
84Id. at 70. 
85 Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 42. 
86Id. 
87 Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 70. 
88 See Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 47. The 1968 UAGA states: "[a] person who acts in 
good £lith and in accord with the terms of this Act or with the anatomical gift laws of another 
state [or a foreign country] is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to 
prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act." 1968 UAGA, supra note 37, § 7. 
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states grant only civil immunity while others grant civil and criminal 
immunity with exceptions in cases of negligence.89 Penalties for 
noncompliance vary as well. Kentucky, for instance, imposes fines 
ranging from $100 to $500 for noncompliance.9o Michigan imposes 
denial or revocation of hospital licenses for failure to comply.91 
3. Continuing Federal Efforts 
Throughout the late 1980s, the federal government continued to 
ensure that all states comply with some form of required request 
regardless of whether or not they had passed their own state stat-
utes. Responding to the Task Force report issued in 1986, Congress 
passed the 1986 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) which 
requires hospitals to develop routine inquiry protocols similar to 
those included in California's routine inquiry statute.92 Mandatory 
protocols include informing the patient or family of its opportunity 
to donate, waiving the requirement when hospital personnel would 
be uncomfortable with the action, identifYing potential donors, and 
notifYing OPAs of potential donors.93 The OBRA supersedes state 
law but does not prevent states from establishing stricter require-
ments.94 
To further ensure compliance with routine inquiry, on July 31, 
1987, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) proposed 
rules which basically require hospitals to comply with the 1986 
OBRA regulations in order to retain their eligibility for Medicare 
and Medicaid reimbursement.95 The HCFA rules became effective 
on March 31, 1988.96 The rules do not affect the majority of states 
because most states have enacted legislation with more stringent 
requirements than those required in the Medicare regulations.97 
4. The UAGA Revised 
While passage of the HFCA rules was pending, the National Com-
mission on Uniform State Laws revised the UAGA model law of 
89 Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 47. 
90 Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 70. 
91 Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 47. 
92 See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 72; see also discussion supra part I.C.2.h. 
93 See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 72. 
94 [d. at 66. 
95 [d. at 73. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. at 74-75. 
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1968.98 The revised UAGA of 1987 includes both routine inquiry and 
required request provisions.99 Under this act, hospital personnel are 
required to ask each patient admitted if she is an organ donor, and 
if she is not, they must inform the patient of her option to donate. lOo 
If the medical records do not indicate the patient's wishes and the 
patient is a medically suitable donor, hospitals are required to re-
quest donation from the patient's family upon the patient's death. lOl 
The 1987 UAGA also affirmatively requires the hospital's emergency 
staff to search for information indicating whether a patient, near 
death or dead, is a donor. lo2 
National efforts continue to encourage hospitals to comply with 
organ procurement regulations. Recently, the Joint Commissioners 
for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations began examining 
hospital organ donation policies as part of their annual accredita-
tion reviews. lo3 Despite the prevalence of required request and rou-
tine inquiry legislation currently in place, there are still thousands 
of U.S. citizens who die each year while awaiting an organ trans-
plant. lo4 This reality has caused many critics to push for presumed 
consent legislation, that is, laws which offer a more aggressive ap-
proach to organ procuremen t. 
D. Presumed Consent 
Dissatisfaction with encouraged voluntarism and required request 
has caused a resurgence of interest in organ procurement ap-
proaches involving "presumed consent." Under encouraged volun-
tarism and required request, the general presumption is one of 
nonconsent. 105 Therefore, individuals or their families must explic-
itly "opt into" the system if they wish to make an anatomical gift 
rather than "opt out" if they do not wish to donate. lo6 A system of 
presumed consent reverses the presumption, and presumes that the 
decedent'is willing to have her organs removed for transplant upon 
death unless she or her family has expressly objected. lo7 In the 
98 1987 UAGA, supra note 35. 
99 [d. § 5. 
100 [d. 
101 Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 71-72. 
102 [d. at 72. 
103Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155. 
104 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
I05Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1. 
106 [d. 
107 [d. 
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absence of an objection, the hospital is entitled to assume that it has 
permission to remove any needed organs and can do so with immu-
nity from liability. lOS The concept of presumed consent is not new. 
It was first advocated by Dukeminier and Sanders, a U.S. lawyer-doc-
tor team, in 1968, when transplant technological successes first 
raised awareness of national organ shortages. 109 
Not all systems of presumed consent are identical. A pure system 
of presumed consent mandates that only the decedent can opt-out 
during his lifetime yo The family's wishes are not sought, nor are 
they grounds for a hospital to refrain from procuring the organ. In 
less strict applications of presumed consent, the family may, of its 
own volition, object to donation, but its wishes are not actively 
sought by the medical staff.1ll Under such a system, however, health 
care professionals may not proceed with removal if they are aware 
of the decedent's or the family's objection. ll2 Not only does pre-
sumed consent reverse the presumption concerning one's willing-
ness to donate, it also shifts the burden of determining whether 
consent exists from the health care worker to the potential donor 
and her family.ll3 Individuals unfamiliar with U.S. organ donation 
laws, often perceive presumed consent as an unnecessarily drastic 
solution to the organ shortage. These same individuals are often 
unaware that varying degrees of presumed consent legislation have 
already been enacted and legally upheld in the United States. 
1. Modified Presumed Consent and Reasonable Effort Laws in 
the United States 
Several states currently have laws which allow coroners or medical 
examiners to authorize the removal of corneas or pituitary glands 
when the coroner or examiner knows of no objections by the de-
ceased or the next-of-kin.n4 These laws do not require the coroner 
108 Id. at 5. 
109 Id. 
110 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 16; see also discussion infra part 1.E.3. 
111 See, e.g., William N. Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ Donation: Lessons From the French 
Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.V.]. INT'!, L. & POL. 1013,1023 & n.55 (1986-87) (discussing 
the French presumed consent law prior to the 1983 Council of State decision). 
112 See id. 
113 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 5. 
114 See Jaffe, supra note 15, at 535. 
Other requirements include the following: 
(1) a request for such tissue for the purposes of transplant or therapy must be made 
by an authorized recipient; 
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to make any affirmative effort to determine the preferences of the 
deceased or her next-of-kin. ll5 Hawaii's law goes even further and 
allows the coroner to remove any tissues regardless of whether or 
not there is a known objection.1l6 Vermont allows pituitaries to be 
removed unless a religious objection is brought. ll7 
Other states have less discretionary, more limited presumed con-
sent laws which require the coroner to make a "reasonable effort" 
to notify the appropriate persons and obtain their consent for do-
nation.us Once a reasonable effort has been made and fails, how-
ever, the coroner may proceed with removal.1l9 The UAGA's 1987 
revision permits removal of all organs after a reasonable effort by 
the coroner. 120 Many foreign countries have enacted more extensive 
presumed consent laws than those currently in existence in the 
United States. 
(2) the removal would not interfere with the course of an autopsy or other investi-
gation and; 
(3) the removal would not alter the decedent's facial appearance. 
The laws also grant the coroner immunity from liability in the event that the family sues after 
the removal claiming they objected to the removal. States which have such limited presumed 
consent laws are: Arkansas (pituitary); California (pituitary and cornea); Colorado (pituitary); 
Connecticut (pituitary and cornea); Delaware (cornea); Florida (cornea); Georgia (cornea 
and eye); Kentucky (cornea); Maryland (cornea); Michigan (cornea); Missouri (pituitary); 
North Carolina (cornea); Ohio (cornea); Oklahoma (pituitary); Tennessee (cornea); Texas 
(cornea); and West Virginia (cornea). See id. & n.35. 
115 See id. at 536. 
116 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 9. 
117 Id. 
118 See Jaffe, supra note 15, at 536-37. States with reasonable effort laws include the follow-
ing: Arizona (corneas-diligent effort); Arkansas (all parts); California (all organs and pace-
makers); Colorado (corneas); Hawaii (all parts); Idaho (all parts); Illinois (corneas); Louisi-
ana (eyes, kidneys, heart, lungs, liver, soft tissue, and bone-good faith effort); Maryland 
(internal organs); Massachusetts (corneas-good faith effort); Mississippi (all parts); Montana 
(all parts); North Dakota (all parts); Rhode Island (all parts); Texas (nonvisceral organs); 
Utah (all parts); Washington (corneas). Arkansas' and California's laws authorize removal not 
just by coroners but by hospitals in general. Id. at 537 & n.39. 
119 See id. at 537. 
120 See id. The added requirement of making a reasonable effort to obtain consent seems 
to impact procurement results significantly. While Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan and 
Texas-states which require only that no objection be known-harvest more corneal tissue 
than they need; states like Arizona, Colorado, and Utah require reasonable efforts and still 
have to import corneal tissue from other states. See P.T. Menzel, The Moral Duty to Contribute 
and Its Implication for Organ Procurement Policy, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2175, 
2178 (1992). 
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E. Presumed Consent Abroad 
1. Presumed Consent in France 
The French have had a system of presumed consent for organ 
donation since 1976. On December 22, 1976, the French legislature, 
acknowledging a growing shortage of kidneys for transplantation,121 
passed the Law of France No. 76-1181, also called the Caillavet Law, 
after Senator Henri Caillavet who introduced the bill. 122 The law 
provides, in pertinent part: 
An organ to be used for therapeutic or scientific purposes 
may be removed from the cadaver of a person who has not 
during his lifetime made known his refusal of such proce-
dure. If, however, the cadaver is that of a minor or a 
mentally defective person, organ removal for transplanta-
tion must be authorised by his legal representative. 123 
The law also grants France's highest advisory and dispute-resolving 
judicial body, the Council of State, the authority to determine how 
the law is to be administered.124 
On March 31, 1978, the Council of State issued an application 
decree which specified the law's procedural requirements. 125 The 
decree granted the potential donor the right to object to the dona-
tion of his or her organs "by any means," either at the time of 
admission to the hospital or any other time. 126 Any objection made 
would be registered in a hospital register maintained for that pur-
pose. 127 It also authorizes anyone bearing witness to a patient's ob-
121 In France in 1976, roughly 350 kidney transplants were performed, while more than 
1,800 patients awaited available kidneys. SCOTT, supra note 10, at 17-18. 
122 See id. at 76. Some say that the Caillavet law was based on a decree of October 20, 1947, 
which authorized cadaveric organ removal to take place for therapeutic or scientific purposes 
without familial consent, provided the decedent had made no objections, and certain other 
conditions were met SeeJ.A. Farfor, Organs for Transplant: ClYUrageous Legislation, BRIT. MED. 
J. 497, 497 (Feb. 19, 1977). There is some debate, however, that the decree, issued so long 
before viable transplants were performed, was solely designed to facilitate official autopsies, 
allowing the medical community to retain tissues removed during those procedures, and not 
to authorize organ removal for transplantation purposes. See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 67-68. 
This decree was followed by Public Law No. 49.890 enacted on July 7,1949, which pertained 
to tissue procurement for the purpose of transplantation, authorizing the "practice of corneal 
grafting with the aid of voluntary eye donors." See id. at 68. 
123 See Farfor, supra note 122, at 497. 
124 See Gerson, supra note 111, at 1022 & n.49. 
125 See id. at 1022-23; see also SCOTT, supra note 10, at 77. 
126 See Gerson, supra note 111, at 1023. 
127 [d. 
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jection to register the patient's refusal in the same hospital regis-
ter.128 Any physician who is responsible for removing organs from a 
patient recently deceased must check the hospital register to verify 
that no objection has been made. 129 The law requires, in effect, that 
a reasonable effort be made to determine whether any objections 
have been registered, but does not require, as do some of the U.S. 
presumed consent laws, a reasonable effort to obtain consent from 
the family of the deceased.130 
A Circular of the Ministry of Health and Social Security, issued on 
April 3, 1978, further refined the law's procedural requirements. l3l 
It prohibits the physician from proceeding with the removal if, even 
after finding no objections on the hospital chart, the doctor obtains 
direct knowledge of the decedent's objection via a written document 
or a third person.132 The law is intended to respect only the wishes 
expressed by the decedent, and not the independent wishes of her 
family, although the family is allowed to register objections on behalf 
of the decedent.133 It was however, realistically impossible to prevent 
a family from issuing an objection of its own under the guise of the 
decedent's wishes because the decedent was no longer available to 
contradict his family's claim. Therefore, in 1983, the Council of 
State issued a decision that a donor's family cannot prevent organ 
removal when the now-deceased patient did not object to donation 
while alive.134 In practice, however, physicians rarely remove organs 
if the family objects.135 
2. Presumed Consent in Belgium 
In June 1986, following recommendations issued by the Council 
of Europe, Belgium passed a presumed consent law which was im-
plemented in February 1987.136 Belgium has a computerized central 
128 [d. 
129 [d. 
130 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
131 See Gerson, supra note 111, at 1023-24 & n.57. This Circular is an administrative reg-
ulation issued pursuant to a statute and, therefore, has the full force of law. [d. 
132 [d. at 1024. 
133 [d. 
134ld. 
135 See discussion infra part ILE. 
136L. Roels et aI., Effect of Presumed Consent Law of Organ Retrieval in Belgium, 22 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2078, 2078 (1990) [hereinafter Roels, Effect of Presumed Consent]. 
There is some evidence that presumed consent has been practiced in Belgium since 1965 
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Health Authority registry continuously accessible to transplant cen-
ters through which objections to postmortem organ removal can be 
registered. 137 This computer network works in conjunction with na-
tionwide informational campaigns designed to educate the public 
about the need for organs, and to educate health care professionals 
about advances in transplant technology.13s Although, like the 
French law, the Belgian law allows doctors to remove organs without 
familial consent, in practice Belgian doctors also inform families of 
their option to refuse and ask if they object. 139 
3. Presumed Consent in Austria 
The only country which has a "pure" system of presumed con-
sent-one which does not offer the next-of-kin an opportunity to 
object to donation of the deceased's organs-is Austria. 140 Austrian 
physicians appear to exercise their discretion granted under the law 
and do not discuss donation with the family, unless the family raises 
the issue, or unless the deceased is a minor or a foreigner. 141 An 
Austrian citizen who wishes to object to donation must do so in 
writing, in order for the refusal to be legally valid. 142 The physician, 
however, has no affirmative duty to search for documents indicating 
consent or nonconsent. If there is doubt regarding the decedent's 
wishes, removal is permitted. Interestingly enough, the means by 
which citizens are allowed to object are not specified in the legisla-
tion. 143 
when a regulation was introduced in the teaching hospital of the University of Ghent by 
Professor R. Dierkens, Secretary-General of the World Association for Medical Law. Although 
the regulation was followed in other Belgian teaching hospitals, it did not have the force of 
legislation. See Farfor, supra note 122, at 498. 
137 See Roels, Effect of Presumed Consent, supra note 136, at 2078. 
138 Id. at 2079. 
139 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 16. 
140 Id. at 16, 27. 
141 See id. at 16-17. There seems to be conflicting analysis regarding the law's applicability 
to foreigners. Mehlman reports that exceptions to the practice are made for foreigners, 
whereas Land and Cohen contend that the law is applicable to foreign tourists who die in 
Austria. The latter do concede, however, that the incidence of organs procured from foreign 
tourists is "very low." See W. Land and B. Cohen, Postmortem and Living Organ Donation in 
Europe: Transplant Laws and Activities, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2165, 2165-66 
(1992). 
142 See Land & Cohen, supra note 141, at 2165. 
143 The Austrian law is derived from a decree of Queen Maria Theresa (reign 1740-1780) 
which authorized nonconsensual organ removal during autopsies. Id. 
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4. Presumed Consent in Singapore 
In 1987, Singapore became the first Asian country to enact pre-
sumed consent legislation for cadaveric kidney donation.144 The 
Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) creates a presumption that 
all non-Muslim, permanent residents of Singapore between the ages 
of twenty-one and sixty and of sound mind agree to donate their 
kidneys upon death unless they have signed an objection form 
during their lifetime.145 Persons below the age of twenty-one or of 
unsound mind cannot be donors without the express consent of 
their parent or legal guardian. 146 Persons and organs not covered by 
the HOTA are still covered by the Medical (Therapy, Education and 
Research) Act of 1972 (MTA).147 This earlier act provided a legal 
framework for the voluntary donation of all organs, much like the 
UAGA did for the United States.148 The HOTA, despite its title, 
pertains only to kidney removal and not to other human organs. 
The law governs the removal of kidneys from the bodies of accident 
victims only.149 It defines death as an irreversible cessation of all 
brain functions (brain death), a determination considered by some 
to be a critical element of any organ transplant law,150 and stipulates 
the conditions which must be met before any removal can occur.151 
Lastly, it prohibits the commercial trade of organs and blood prod-
ucts.152 The law remains silent on the issue of living donors.153 
The HOTA imposes specific procedural requirements upon par-
ticipating hospitals. The coroner must determine the nature of the 
accident and consent to all removals before one can be carried 
out.154 The hospital has an affirmative duty to conduct "reasonable 
144 See P. Soh et aI., Profile of an Asian "Opting-Out" System-The Institutional and Legal 
Arrangements in Singapore, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1323, 1323 (1992). 
145Id. 
146 See T.K.K. Iyer, Kidneys for Transplant- "opting Out" Law In Singapore, 35 FORENSIC 
SCIENCE INT'L 131, 134 (1987). 
147 See P. Soh and S.M.L. Lim, Opting Out Law: A Model for Asia-The Singapore Experience, 
24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1337, 1337 (1992). 
148 See id.; see also discussion supra part I.B. 
149 See Soh, supra note 144, at 1323. Accident victims often provide suitable organs since 
they are almost always brought to hospitals and are often likely to be young adults without 
chronic medical problems. See Iyer, supra note 146, at 134. 
150 See Soh, supra note 144, at 1323. 
151Id. 
152Id. 
153 See Iyer, supra note 146, at 140. 
154 See Soh, supra note 144, at 1323. 
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and proper" inquiries for registered objections before removal. I55 
The determination of brain death can be made only after a series 
of tests have been performed by two senior physicians. To ensure 
that premature determinations are not made, the authorized physi-
cians cannot be associated with the transplant team or be involved 
in the care and treatment of the proposed recipient. 156 The law 
grants civil and criminal immunity from liability to medical profes-
sionals and hospitals involved in the procurement and transplanta-
tion procedures. 157 In addition, it imposes criminal penalties for 
violations of HOTA, imposing maximum fines of 100 Singapore 
dollars and/or one year of imprisonment. 158 
The opting-out methods in Singapore appear to be more fully 
developed than those found in France, Belgium, and Austria. Ob-
jection forms to donation are "widely available" and can be obtained 
at post offices and other easily accessible public institutions. 159 In 
addition, all Singaporeans receive a letter just prior to their twenty-
first birthday, informing them of their to duty to opt-out if they so 
desire. 160 Once an objection is registered, it is sent to the director of 
medical services, processed within 24 hours, and is entered on a 
confidential computerized registry accessible to the five major gen-
eral hospitals in Singapore.161 Objections can be withdrawn by filing 
a form similar to the original objection form. 162 
II. DISCUSSION 
The United States has yet to eradicate shortages of transplantable 
organs. To determine why U.S. policies, past and present, have 
failed, and to propose a more effective policy of donation, one must 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of each of the various 
donation systems. There is no consensus among scholars and trans-
plant professionals as to whether required request has conclusively 
failed. Yet the significant numbers of people still awaiting organs 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See Iyer, supra note 146, at 133. 
158 [d. at 134. 
159 See Soh, supra note 144, at 1323; see also Iyer, supra note 146, at 134. 
160 See Soh, supra note 144, at 1323. 
161 See id. The computerized registry is not open to the public. It keeps confidential not 
only the names of objectors but also the names of persons from whom kidneys are removed 
and their recipients. See Iyer, supra note 146, at 134. 
162 See Iyer, supra note 146, at 134. 
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suggests that the system has been ineffective. A thorough apprecia-
tion of the gains achieved by presumed consent policies in the 
United States and abroad will help to determine whether the United 
States should now consider replacing required request legislation 
with presumed consent laws. 
A. The Demise of Encouraged Voluntarism 
Initially, encouraged voluntarism was lauded because it "encour-
age[d] socially desirable virtues such as altruism and benevolence 
without running the risk of abusing individual rights. "163 Encouraged 
voluntarism views the requirement of consent as necessary to protect 
individual rights and maintain public confidence in the medical 
profession. l64 Significantly, the system of encouraged voluntarism is 
also based on the traditionally held belief that the family has the 
authority to decide what will happen to the deceased prior to burial, 
and that the family is most likely to represent the true intent of the 
decedent regarding her desire to donate her organs. 165 
At the time of its inception, the system that the UAGA imple-
mented was criticized. Some felt that, given the lack of prohibition 
in many states on the sale of body parts and of donation by living 
persons, adoption of the UAGA would produce a commercial mar-
ket in organs. 166 Both living donors and next-of-kin would have an 
interest in selling body parts and could authorize the removal of 
such parts.167 Some critics felt that the high costs of promoting such 
a system through educational campaigns was unnecessary given the 
willingness of Americans-reflected in public opinion polls-to 
have their organs used to benefit others upon their death.168 
Although some commentators lauded the UAGA for respecting 
individual rights, there were others who felt the Act did not provide 
enough protection.169 They objected to the overriding power which 
163 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 24. 
164 See Jaffe, supra note 15, at 535. 
165 See C. Cohen, The Case For Presumed Consent to Transplant Human Organs After Death, 
24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2168, 2168 (1992). Under § 2b of the 1968 UAGA, it is 
illegal to ignore the wishes of the decedent in favor of those of the family. For example, if the 
decedent has a valid donor card, the physician is not supposed to allow the family's refusal 
to override the decedent's wishes. 1968 UAGA, supra note 37, § 2; see also Mehlman, supra 
note 6, at n.69. 
166 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 23. 
167ld. 
168Id. 
169 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 72-73. 
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the UAGA granted to the state. The UAGA allowed the coroner to 
conduct legally required autopsies or postmortem examinations 
which, if done, would annul any anatomical gift. 170 Some critics felt 
that individual autonomy was betrayed any time a physician re-
quested familial consent when the deceased had already expressly 
consented by completing a donor card.l71 This practice, they argued, 
undermined the philosophical aim of the UAGA: to give priority to 
the wishes of the deceased over that of the family.172 
Critics at the other end of the spectrum, however, objected that 
the UAGA gave too much weight to individual autonomy.173 They 
argued that the rights of patients who would die if they did not 
receive an organ transplant should supersede the wishes of the 
deceased and her family in order to more significantly benefit soci-
ety.l74 Others felt that the UAGA disrespected the long-followed 
tradition of granting the deceased's family the right to determine 
what would be done with the corpse prior to burial. The individual 
autonomy granted by the UAGA challenged, in theory if not in 
practice, the family's right in this respect. These critics argued that 
the family should always have the final say regarding organ donation 
because decisions of proper treatment of a corpse are "inextricably 
linked with how a family will deal with its grief."175 The deceased, 
they argued, should not be able to decide a matter which properly 
should be left to the grieving family.176 
Although the medical community had high hopes for the success 
of encouraged voluntarism and for the role the UAGA would play 
in that success, by the mid-1980s it was widely acknowledged that the 
system had failed. 177 Several factors were responsible for the growing 
gap between the demand for and supply of organs. As transplant 
technology and patient survival rates improved, the demand for 
organs increased.178 Despite widespread availability of organ donor 
cards and public education campaigns, the number of actual organ 
donors did not increase in proportion to the increased demand. 179 
170Id. 
171 See Arthur J. Matas et aI., A Proposal for Cadaver Organ Procurement: Routine Removal 
With Right of Informed Refusal, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & L. 231, 235 (1985). 
172 Id. 
173 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 72-73. 
174Id. 
175 See Matas, supra note 171, at 236. 
176Id. 
177 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 4. 
178 See Sadler, supra note 42, at 2173. 
179 Id. In 1989, 1,878 patients died while waiting for a transplantable organ. Id. 
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Encouraged voluntarism proved inadequate to overcome the many 
factors that contribute to the shortage of organs. Some of these 
factors relate to potential donors' reluctance, reluctance on behalf 
of the family, and inadequate efforts on behalf of the medical com-
munity. 
1. Personal Reluctance to Donate One's Own Organs 
Under encouraged voluntarism, organ procurement is easiest 
when the deceased dies carrying a valid organ donor card, and the 
family does not object to the deceased's desire to donate. The vast 
majority of U.S. citizens, however, do not carry organ donor cards. ISO 
In addition, individuals who have valid cards often do not have them 
in their possession at the time of their death. lSI There are a myriad 
of reasons why individuals are reluctant or unwilling to become 
donors. Some people are reluctant to face their own mortality, or 
are simply disgusted with the thought of donating their organs. IS2 
Many individuals fear that if the hospital knows they are donors, the 
medical staffs, in their zeal to obtain organs, will not make every 
effort to save them, or will actually allow their organs to be removed 
before the individuals are, in fact, dead. ls3 A segment of the popu-
lation objects on religious grounds to the removal of organs or to 
the acceptance of brain death as a definition of death. ls4 Others 
180 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 4. A 1985 Gallup poll found that although 75% of the 
people surveyed favored organ donation, and 27% responded that they were very likely to 
donate their organs, only 17% had signed donor cards. Other studies showed even lower rates 
of card carriers. See id. at n.12. 
181 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 24. 
182 See Matas, supra note 171, at 236; see also Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 24. This is also 
a popular reason people die without having made a will, or lapse into a vegetative state without 
having made a living will. 
183 See Cohen, supra note 165, at 2171. This fear is addressed specifically in literature 
disseminated to potential donors by the National Kidney Foundation: "Donors receive the 
same high quality care that non-donors receive. Medical personnel must follow very strict 
guidelines before death can be pronounced and the donor's organs and tissue are removed." 
National Kidney Found., About Organ and Tissue Donation 10 (1990 ed.). 
184 See Cohen, supra note 165, at 2171. Some Orthodox Jews object to the recognition of 
brain death as death, and therefore, object to the removal of organs upon brain death. Some 
followers of religions who believe in the resurrection of their bodies in the afterlife oppose 
donation. [d. Orthodox Jews and Japanese Shinto religion adherents seem to be unequivocally 
opposed to any approach that would deny the family the right to object to donation. Oppo-
sition among these various religions may vary, however, depending upon which organ is 
considered, whether non-transplant alternatives exist, and how great the probability is that a 
life will be saved through transplant. See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 32, 34. For a more 
complete discussion of the Jewish orthodox position see id. at nn.96-97 and accompanying 
text. 
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simply believe that the decision whether to donate should be left to 
the surviving family, not the deceased. 185 
2. Reluctance on Behalf of Next-of-Kin to Authorize Removal 
Public opinion surveys often reflect a widespread willingness of 
individuals to authorize the donation of body parts belonging to a 
loved one who has not objected during his lifetime. Statistics show, 
however, that a greater percentage of individuals refuse to authorize 
donation when actually confronted with the decision.186 Several pos-
sible explanations for this discrepancy exist. The family, approached 
at the height of its grief, may be psychologically or emotionally 
unable to make such an important decision.187 If the patient has not 
yet died, the request for organ removal seems to eliminate all hope 
that the patient might recover, and thus authorization may be too 
painful to give. 188 Often the family of a brain dead patient does not 
believe the patient is "actually dead" because the patient may still 
have a heartbeat, normal color, or "functioning" digestive, metabo-
lic, and elimination systems, albeit sustained by machinery.189 
3. Inadequate Efforts on Behalf of Medical Personnel 
The medical profession has also received wide criticism of its 
efforts at obtaining organs from suitable donors.19o Often doctors 
Some scholars. however, have asserted that religious objections are given too much sig-
nificance in debate over systems of organ procurement. See Cohen, supra note 165, at 2171. 
The Health and Human Services Task Force on Organ Donation in 1986 contended that "no 
major religious group in the United States opposes organ donation as a matter of formal 
doctrine." Mehlman, supra note 6, at 31. Further, the National Kidney Foundation and the 
American Association of Critical-Care Nurses contend, in their literature that "[a] recent 
Gallup Survey found that less than 10 percent were aware that their religion has laws or 
doctrines governing organ and tissue donation." See The Nat'l Kidney Found. and American 
Assn. of Critical-Care Nurses, Religious Views on Organ/Tissue Donation and Transplantation, 
at 35 [hereinafter NKF Religious Views]. The literature also lists the Amish, Baptist, Buddhist, 
Roman Catholic, Hindu, Evangelical, Islamic, Jehovah's Witness, and Jewish religions as 
supporting organ and tissue donation under certain circumstances. See id. 
185 See Matas, supra note 171, at 236. 
186 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at n.73, citing study which showed that while 75% of the 
populace agree theoretically to organ donation, 85% refuse to donate when asked, on their 
deathbeds, to do so. 
187 See Cohen, supra note 165, at 2168. 
188 See Matas, supra note 171, at 232. 
189 See id. at 233; see also Stuart]. Youngner, M.D., Brain Death and Organ Procurement: Some 
Vexing Problems Remain, 19 DIALYSIS & TRANSPIANTATION 12, 14 (1990). 
190 See, e.g., Youngner, supra note 189, at 14; Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 27; Gerson, 
supra note 111, at 1027-28. 
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are reluctant to approach the family and request permission for 
organ removal because they feel that the family should not be 
subjected to difficult decisions at the time of its deepest grief. Doc-
tors may be inadequately trained to tactfully broach such a difficult 
subject, or may fear an organ request would serve to aggravate their 
"failure" of not having been able to save the patient. 191 In most cases, 
even when the patient possesses a valid donor card, the doctor will 
nonetheless request the family's consent, either out of respect for 
the family's wishes, or out of fear that legal liability might result if 
the doctor were to carry out the wishes of the decedent over the 
objections of the family.192 In such cases, family refusal results in the 
denial of what would otherwise be a successful, and legal removal,l93 
A problem unrelated to obtaining consent is the failure of medical 
personnel to identifY potential donors. In most states, a person is 
legally dead upon brain death. 194 Organs that are harvested as soon 
as possible after death have the greatest success for transplant. 195 
Therefore, it is critical for transplantation success that potential 
donors be identified either before they are brain dead or immedi-
ately upon death. Polls show, however, that many health care pro-
fessionals have a poor understanding of brain death, and this, in 
turn, greatly impedes their ability to identifY donors and obtain 
consent. 196 
191 See Youngner, supra note 189, at 14. 
192 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 4; see also Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 24. According to 
a 1985 article, no organ procurement agency will remove organs solely on the approval of a 
signed donor card, although the existence of one may encourage the family to consent. See 
Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 67. 
1935ome critics of encouraged voluntarism argue that the practice of obtaining familial 
consent, even when the deceased has a valid donor card, undermines the philosophical aim 
of the UAGA which was to give priority to the wishes of the deceased over that of her family. 
See Matas, supra note 171, at 235. 
194 See id. at 234; see also Youngner, supra note 189, at 12. At least 37 states and the District 
of Columbia statutorily define death as brain death, based on criteria developed in 1968, 
known as the "Harvard criteria." The 1986 Task Force recommended that those states that 
had not adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act should do so, since the act provides 
a uniform definition of brain death. See Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 40 & n.28. 
195 "For purposes of transplantation, [r 1 ecovering organs from heart-beating cadavers mini-
mizes cellular injury to the organ." Sipes, Approach, supra note 51, at 40. 
196 See Youngner, supra note 189, at 12. In a study of 195 health professionals, including 
neurosurgery residents, medical and surgical intensive-care·unit attending physicians and 
nurses, medical residents, operating room nurses and anesthesiologists at four university-affili-
ated hospitals in Cleveland, published in 1990, researchers found that only 63% correctly 
identified irreversible loss of all brain function as the medical criterion for declaring a patient 
brain dead. [d. 
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All of these practical, psychological, and ethical conflicts have 
worked together to produce insufficient supplies of transplantable 
organs. The crucial fact is that there are a sufficient number of 
deaths each year to supply all of the needed organs-enough to 
transplant into each adult and child waiting for an organ. 197 By 1985, 
this realization led the medical profession, bioethicists, and legisla-
tures to acknowledge that encouraged voluntarism under the UAGA 
had failed, and spurred their search for feasible alternatives to a 
system which had once held such promise. 
B. Required Request and Routine Inquiry 
The adoption of required request and routine inquiry statutes in 
the 1980s was an attempt to understand and eliminate the discrep-
ancy between the high numbers of people who claimed to be willing 
to donate their organs and the organs of their loved ones, and the 
small number of organs actually procured. 19B Given the public's 
apparent willingness to donate when asked by a physician, transplant 
scholars felt that the puzzling discrepancy was due, in large part, to 
the failure of health care professionals to request donation from the 
family of the deceased. 199 
In theory, a system of required request or routine inquiry can 
increase organ procurement simply by ensuring that opportunities 
to request consent are not overlooked by the medical community.20o 
Required request is appealing from an ethical standpoint since it 
modifies only slightly the system of encouraged voluntarism. It en-
courages altruism, protects individual autonomy, and respects the 
rights of the family while potentially increasing the supply of pro-
cured organs.201 
Required request is premised on the belief that both the medical 
staff and the family will suffer less psychological stress if organ 
requests are made routinely.202 Medical personnel will grow more 
197This is not meant to imply that all transplants will be successful, but with the rapid 
improvement in transplant technology, and the already high success rates, there is no reason 
why an adequate supply of organs could not, in the near future, result in almost perfect 
survival rates of all people in need of a transplant and receiving one. 
19R See Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155. 
199 [d. 
200 See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 67. 
201 See Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155; see also Arthur L. Caplan, Requests, Gifts, 
and Obligations: The Ethics of Organ Procurement, 28 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 49, 53 
(1986) [hereinafter Caplan, Requests, Gifts, and Obligations]. 
202 See Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155; see also Caplan, Requests, Gifts and Obliga-
tions, supra note 201, at 54. 
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comfortable with the process of requesting consent as such requests 
become standard operating procedure.203 Similarly, the public will 
soon come to expect such requests and will consider them a normal 
part of the process of a hospital death. 204 This expectation of being 
asked to donate, it is reasoned, may cause family members to discuss 
their desires concerning donation while they are alive.205 
V nder a system of required request, organs cannot be removed 
from an individual unless the deceased has explicitly consented 
while living, or the deceased's family has consented.206 Some propo-
nents of required request contend that since the family is usually 
responsible for the disposition of the body, such as arranging for 
burial, an additional inquiry regarding organ donation is unlikely 
to overly burden the family.207 Although the effects of required 
request and routine inquiry laws have not been conclusively estab-
lished, nine years after the first required request laws were enacted, 
there are still approximately 34,000 V.S. residents waiting for avail-
able organs.208 This has fostered a growing perception that such laws 
have failed to solve the organ shortage crisis.209 
Studies evaluating the success of required request legislation have 
varied greatly in their findings. 210 This is due to the small number 
of studies that have been executed and the inadequate reporting 
systems that characterize many of the required request laws.211 Ac-
cording to several studies, required request legislation has resulted 
in increases in organ donations.212 In Oregon, monthly collections 
of eyes increased 135 percent during the first year of required 
request, and bone and skin donations increased 20-25 percent.213 In 
New York, data revealed a 94 percent increase in heart donations, 
96 percent increase in livers, 23 percent increase in kidneys, and 58 
percent increase in eyes during the year following the passage of 
required request legislation.214 
203 See Virnig & Caplan, supra note 58, at 2155. 
204 See Caplan, Requests, Gifts and Obligations, supra note 201, at 54. 
205Id. 
206Id. 
207Id. 
208 See UNOS Waitlist, supra note 1. 
209 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 11. 
210 See id. 
2ll See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 75. 
212 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 11. 
213 [d. 
214Id. 
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While these statistics appear promising, other studies reveal much 
less favorable results. In Maryland, studies showed no increase in 
the consent rate despite an increase in donor referrals to organ 
procurement agencies.215 The ratio of donations to requests in-
creased only 3 percent after the enactment of required request. 216 
In Oregon, despite increases in eyes, skin, and bone donations, 
kidney donations dropped during the first year that required re-
quest was implemented.217 In Los Angeles, the number of referrals 
to OPAs increased during the first year of routine inquiry require-
ments, but the number of donors remained approximately the same 
as it had been before the legislation was passed.218 Additionally, in 
1987, local referrals to Los Angeles OPAs dropped by approximately 
five hundred.219 New Jersey experienced similarly disappointing re-
sults following its enactment of legislation. One study of the South-
ern region of the state found no statistically significant change in 
organ procurement after the passage of New Jersey's legislation.22o 
Further, a 1989 survey of OPAs in states with required request (and 
routine inquiry) legislation revealed that although nine out of ten 
respondents had experienced an increase in referrals, only two 
reported a major increase in vital organ donations. 221 
While these findings are insufficient to establish conclusively the 
failure of required request legislation, it is evident that substantial 
weaknesses still exist. Experts attribute several factors to the disap-
pointing results of the legislation.222 Often health professionals re-
sponsible for requesting organs are inadequately trained to do SO.223 
Occasionally physicians will refuse to comply or will do so half-heart-
edly because they regard required request laws as "bureaucratic 
intrusions into the practice of medicine."224 Often physicians are 
provided little incentive to request donation because there are in-
215Id. at 12. 
216Id. 
217 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 12. This drop, however, may have been due to an unexplained 
drop in mortality that year. See Andersen & Fox, supra note 49, at 75. In Oregon, the data 
obtained cannot be attributed conclusively to required request legislation, since the state also 
experienced a growth in the number of its transplant programs that year. Id. 
218 See id. at 75-76. 
219 See id. at 76. 
220 See Steven E. Ross, M.D., F.A.C.S. et aI., Impact of Required Request on Vital Organ 
Procurement, 30 J. TRAUMA 820, 820 (1990). 
221 See id. at 822. 
2T2 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 10. 
223Id. at 13. 
224Id. 
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sufficient penalties for noncompliance.225 The existence of "loop-
holes" sometimes allows physicians to easily circumvent the require-
ments.226 Finally, legislation is ineffective in states that lack legisla-
tively defined criteria for brain death.227 
The key to success seems to lie in educating health professionals 
to better identify suitable candidates, accept the importance of or-
gan donation, and learn how to approach families for consent in 
the most effective manner. The need for public education, as well, 
cannot be overestimated. It is vital that the public increase its aware-
ness of the need for organs. It is imperative that an individual choose 
whether to become a donor during his or her lifetime and that he 
or she, while still living, make those wishes known to his or her 
family. Finally, the only way to determine the effectiveness of re-
quired request legislation is to improve monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms of hospitals complying with required request laws. 
It is evident that more comprehensive studies must be carried out 
in order to assess accurately the performance of required request 
legislation. Many experts in the transplant community feel, however, 
that no further analyses of required request are necessary, given the 
huge numbers of patients still waiting for organs and the estimated 
2,567 patients that died while waiting for available organs, in 1992 
alone.228 These statistics, they claim, speak for themselves and indi-
cate that the time for more drastic measures has arrived.229 
C. Can Presumed Consent Solve the Organ Shortage? 
1. The Advantages of Presumed Consent 
The issue of presumed consent raises several difficult ethical and 
moral dilemmas. Advocates of presumed consent hail its advantages 
over both encouraged voluntarism and required request. It elimi-
nates the need to carry donor cards and other affirmative expres-
sions of donor willingness, tools which have proven to be both 
underused and ineffective. 23o Additionally, presumed consent elimi-
nates the need for health care professionals to inflict further grief 
225 [d. 
226 [d. 
227 See Ross, supra note 220, at 822. 
228Statistic obtained from telephone conversation with UNOS, Communications Depart-
ment on 2/14/94. 
229 See generally Matas, supra note 171. 
230 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
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on family members who have just recently learned of their loved 
one's death.231 An effective system of presumed consent provides the 
public with ample opportunities to register its objections to dona-
tion. Advocates reason that individuals under a system of presumed 
consent will make their decisions regarding donation at rational 
times, and not during their moments of loss and grief. Thus, the 
decision may be more deliberate and dispassionate than those made 
under systems of encouraged voluntarism and required request. 232 
Presumed consent would eliminate the problems caused by doc-
tors who are reluctant to ask for consent, or who ask without being 
firmly committed to the cause and who, therefore, get poor re-
sultS.233 Less extreme systems of presumed consen t prohibit removal 
of organs from individuals whose families cannot be located and 
therefore cannot object even if they wish to do so. Those who 
advocate these more moderate systems argue that they would still 
produce a supply of organs sufficient to meet demand.234 Some 
supporters argue that enacting a system of presumed consent would 
save the health care industry money because fewer public education 
campaigns would be needed than under a system of encouraged 
voluntarism where the public must constantly be reminded of the 
need to donate organs. 235 
A strong argumen t in favor of presumed consen t is that such a 
system more adequately reflects society's wishes concerning organ 
donation. Since the public opinion surveys show that the over-
whelming majority of Americans are in favor of organ donation and 
transplantation, the proper presumption is one which presumes a 
willingness, rather than an unwillingness, on behalf of the public to 
donate. Presumed consent can avoid various psychological impedi-
ments, such as reluctance to face one's own mortality, which prevent 
individuals from taking affirmative action to donate while alive.236 
2. Disadvantages of Presumed Consent 
Although a system of presumed consent is appealing in its poten-
tial for dramatically increasing the supply of procured organs, it is 
231 [d. 
232 See id. at 19. 
233 For further discussion of doctor reluctance see Ross, supra note 220, at 822. 
234 See Caplan, Costs, supra note 8, at 28. 
235 See id. This position is questionable, however, because great sums would be required to 
ensure that individuals were aware of their duty to opHmt if they so wished. 
236 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 21. 
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often met with strong opposition on various practical, ethical, legal, 
and theological grounds. 
a. Ethical Objections 
Critics of presumed consent feel that such a system is overly 
coercive and antithetical to the values of a democratic society since 
it appears to devalue freedom of choice.237 Some feel it is "so inhu-
mane, manipulative, and unpopular" that even if it does increase 
the supply of organs, its end does not justifY its means.238 
Certain bioethicists argue that a system of presumed consent is 
not morally desirable since it, through the state, removes an oppor-
tunity to act charitably, and thus, renders our community less virtu-
OUS.239 Others argue that it removes the moral dignity of donation 
by making it mandatory.24o There is, however, little reason to believe 
that individuals would not derive equally altruistic satisfaction from 
refraining from objecting under a system of presumed consent than 
they would from explicitly consenting under our current system. An 
individual who has made a conscious decision not to deprive a 
donee of an organ will most likely derive pleasure from that deci-
sion, regardless of what means are used to register his choice. Fur-
ther, as one proponent of presumed consent has stated, "preserving 
the privilege of the few to exercise their virtue is not a morally 
sufficient ground for standing in the way of a policy that could save 
numerous lives."241 
b. Practical Shortcomings 
From a practical standpoint, some critics insist that health profes-
sionals would ignore the freedom that an opting-in system provides 
and would continue to ask the family for their consent even if they 
were not legally obligated to do SO.242 If explicit consent were sought 
routinely, presumed consent would operate no differently than our 
current system in that it would not eliminate the problems of doctor 
reluctance to obtain consent, and thus would not increase the supply 
of procured organs.243 Also, an effective opting-out system would 
237 See id. at 6. 
238 [d. at 22. 
239 See id. at 24. 
240 Caplan, Requests, Gifts and Obligations, supra note 201, at 53. 
241 Matas, supra note 171, at 242. 
242 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 22. 
243 See id. at 50. 
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probably require a centralized computer registry whereby objections 
could be recorded during one's lifetime and consulted upon one's 
death.244 The 1986 TaskForce on Organ Transplantation considered 
and rejected the use of such centralized mechanisms to indicate 
donor willingness to donate.245 Further, from a financial perspective, 
opponents of presumed consent insist that a central registry capable 
of protecting both the right of every person to opt-out as well as 
handling constant modifications and updates would be prohibitively 
expensive.246 
c. Insufficient Safeguards 
Much of the criticism of presumed consent reflects a cynicism that 
a thorough and effective opting-out mechanism could never be 
achieved. If a potential donor or her family were opposed to dona-
tion but did not know that there existed an affirmative duty to 
object, organs could be removed contrary to their wishes.247 This 
situation, it is argued, could substantially increase the family's grief 
and could hurt the medical profession generally by increasing public 
distrust of health care professionals.248 Some ethicists are simply 
uncomfortable with a system that, despite its noble intentions, 
benefits from an individual's or a family's ignorance of the rules. 249 
Similarly, opponents reason that presumed consent would exacer-
bate the public's fear that a physician, in his or her zeal to procure 
an organ, will not try to save a patient's life or will remove organs 
before the patient is actually dead. Since the family is not ap-
proached for its consent, no interested party is there to act as a 
safeguard to prevent such occurrences.250 
d. Unfavorable Public opinion 
Critics contend that although the majority of Americans do favor 
organ donation, this does not mean that they would favor a system 
244 See Caplan, Requests, Gifts and Obligations, supra note 201, at 53. 
245 Mehlman, supra note 6, at n.87 and accompanying text. 
246 Caplan, Requests, Gifts and Obligations, supra note 201, at 53. 
247 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 26. 
248 See id. at 26-27. 
249 See Matas, supra note 171, at 237. 
250 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 49. The UAGA attempts to eliminate this fear by prohib-
iting the attending physician at the time of death and the physician who determines the time 
of death from participating in the removal or transplantation of organs. See id. The public's 
fear, however, persists either because of ignorance of this safeguard or the belief that the 
safeguard is not adequate to protect the patient from premature removals. 
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of presumed consent. They disapprove of presumed consent advo-
cates using statistics which show support for organ donation gener-
ally, as proof of popular support for presumed consen t. In fact, the 
1986 Task Force cited lack of popular support as its only reason for 
rejecting presumed consent as a feasible method of organ procure-
ment.251 
e. Legal Obstacles 
Since the adoption of presumed consent would necessitate state 
action in the form of new state legislation, the system adopted would 
have to be designed so as not to violate state or federal constitutions. 
Challenges to presumed consent would most likely come under the 
First Amendment's prohibition against government interference 
with the free exercise of religion, or the Fifth Amendment's due 
process protection, or its prohibition against government takings of 
private property without just compensation.252 
i. Fifth Amendment Challenges 
If the U.S. government takes private property for public use with-
out providing just compensation to the citizen from whom the 
property is taken, the government has violated the takings clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.253 Some legal scholars have argued that the 
taking of cadaveric organs without the explicit consent of the de-
ceased constitutes such a violation. Currently, however, the courts 
do not recognize property rights in a corpse.254 The law does recog-
nize, however, a "quasi property right" of the family to dispose of 
the decedent's remains in a manner consistent with its state's laws. 255 
251 See id. at 6. In the Gallup poll of 1985 only 7% of the respondents supported a system 
of presumed consent, compared to 75% who approved of organ donation. Id. Some scholars 
in the transplant community insist that public attitudes about presumed consent are currently 
unknown. They assert that previously conducted public opinion surveys have been biased and 
inconclusive because of the way the questions were asked. See id. at 46-48. A 1985 survey 
reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that "an overwhelming 
majority of Americans (86.5% of all respondents surveyed) believe that physicians should not 
have the power to remove organs from people who have died and who have not signed an 
organ donor card without consulting the next of kin." Mehlman, supra note 6, at 45-46 
(quoting Manninen & Evans, Public Attitudes and Behavi(ff Regarding Organ Dunatiun, 253 JAMA 
3111,3114 (1985)). The question, however, did not discuss the opportunity to opt-out during 
one's lifetime. It is therefore possible that respondents regarded the system described to them 
as one of mandatory removal without the right of refusal, instead of one of presumed consent. 
See id. at 45-47. 
252 See id. at 36. 
253U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
254 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 37. 
255 Id. 
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A property right of this nature, though, is not likely to be constitu-
tionally protected.256 In the 1986 case of State v. Powell, the Florida 
Supreme Court ruled that the nonconsensual removal of corneal 
tissue for transplantation during statutorily required autopsies was 
not a constitutionally protected taking of private property.257 Further, 
the federal prohibition on the sale of human organs would likely 
render it impossible to be 'Justly compensated" for one's organs.258 
Due Process challenges to limited presumed consent laws also 
have failed. In State v. Powell, the court held that the right of the 
next-of-kin to dispose of a relative's corpse was not a fundamental 
right protected under either the Federal or Florida State Constitu-
tions.259 In 1984, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a Fifth 
Amendment challenge against the state's limited presumed consent 
law, holding that constitutional rights regarding the integrity of 
one's body end at death. 260 
ii. Civil and Criminal Liability 
Any thoughtfully drafted presumed consent law would provide 
immunity clauses, similar to the UAGA's, for those acting in good 
faith. Such clauses, however, would also have to protect against tort 
claims of infliction of emotional distress by families whose objections 
were not sought and thus were not heeded. In 1988, the Florida 
Court of Appeals, in defining the family's right of burial, focused 
not on the good faith effort of the physician, but on "the effect of 
the same on the feelings and emotions of surviving relatives, who 
have the right to burial. "261 Tort claims could prove fatal to presumed 
consent laws. 
f. Divergent Views On the Ethics of Presumed Consent 
Many of the debates over presumed consent center around the 
issue of individual autonomy. Proponents hail presumed consent as 
a means of protecting autonomy while opponents insist that it seri-
256 [d. 
257 See State v. Powell, 497 So.2d ll88, 1192 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); 
see also Mehlman, supra note 6 at 39; Jaffe, supra note 15, at 538-39. 
258 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 38. 
259 See Powell, 497 So.2d at 1192; see also Mehlman, supra note 6, at 40. 
260 See Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 360 N.W.2d. 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); 
see also Mehlman, supra note 6, at 40. 
261 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 44; see also Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So.2d 682, 684 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Rupp, 228 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1969), aff'd 238 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1970); Kirksey v.Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950)). 
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ously jeopardizes the right. Those who view presumed consent as a 
threat to individual rights stress that the system unfairly presumes 
the deceased is willing to donate even when the deceased's wishes 
are unknown. Presumed consent, therefore, may violate the actual 
desires of the deceased. 262 
Advocates of presumed consent criticize required request by 
pointing out that under a system of required request, as it is cur-
rently practiced, the ultimate decision whether to donate is made 
by the family.263 Even if the deceased carried a valid donor card at 
the time of her death, the hospital will still seek her family's consent. 
If the family's desires happen to conflict with those of the deceased, 
the hospital will respect the family'S decision, in effect allowing it to 
overrule the autonomous wishes of the decedent.264 A pure system 
of presumed consent, one whieh does not entertain the wishes of 
the family, certainly respects individual autonomy if the individual 
has expressly consented during his lifetime. This express consent 
under our current system, however, occurs infrequently. Advocates 
insist that in an effective system of presumed consent where an 
individual is given ample opportunities to opt-out and chooses not 
to do so, his inaction should be treated as acceptance rather than 
refusal. Under our systems of required request and routine inquiry, 
failure to consent explicitly is construed as an unwillingness to 
donate. Some proponents suggest a modified form of presumed 
consent where the family may register its refusal only if it expresses 
what it believes to be the decedent's wishes, not that of the family 
members.265 This safeguard, while palatable in theory, would be 
practically impossible to ensure.266 
Supporters reason that presumed consent best reflects the pulr 
lie's actual desires. They insist that shifting the presumption of 
willingness to donate is morally superior, and further, that the desire 
to donate is not a charitable virtue, but a moral duty.267 Proponents 
argue that all systems of organ procurement make presumptions 
about the desires of the public. Our current system assumes that, 
absent explicit authorization, the decedent wishes that his organs 
not be willed for beneficent medical uses.268 Some scholars insist that 
262 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 20. 
263 See id. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. 
266 See discussion supra part I.E. 1. 
267 See generally Cohen, supra note 165. 
268 See id. at 2168. 
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such a presumption is contrary to the actual wishes of most Ameri-
cans.269 By establishing a presumption of nonconsent, required re-
quest necessitates that the family be asked to make decisions at an 
extremely stressful time. At worst, it results in the death of a person 
who could not wait for the hospital to find a potential donor's family 
and rebut such a presumption.270 
Supporters of presumed consent argue that a reversal of the 
current presumption would reflect more accurately the actual de-
sires of the majority: "[ w ] hether we require consent to be expressed 
or require refusal to be expressed should depend upon what we 
believe the majority would have done in fact, if all had registered 
their views. "271 Mistakes can be made under any system. It is, however, 
socially and morally preferable to remove, by mistake, an organ 
without consent, consequently saving someone's life, than to refrain, 
by mistake, from removing an organ from a consenting donor, thus 
allowing someone to die needlessly.272 Finally, some supporters feel 
that the debate surrounding the consent to organ donation issue is 
based on a misguided attitude about a citizen's duty to donate.273 If 
society viewed organ donation not as simply a charitable act, but as 
a moral duty, it would change the presumptions upon which our 
current system is based, as well as our expectations of those from 
whom we seek consent. 274 Since the field of cadaveric organ procure-
ment is relatively new and society is poorly informed of its complexi-
ties, it is necessary to design a system that guarantees that the rules 
of opting-out and their implications are clearly understood by all.275 
Opponents of presumed consent feel that such a system has yet to 
be proposed and until it is, it would be unwise and dangerous to 
switch to a system of presumed consent.276 Finally, advocates remind 
their detractors that limited presumed consent laws already exist in 
the United States. They contend that the fact that many state legis-
latures have elected to adopt presumed consent laws in certain 
circumstances reveals an underestimation of the public's willingness 
to support such an approach to organ procurement. 
269 [d. at 2169. 
270 See id. 
271 [d. at 2172. 
272 See Cohen, supra note 165, at 2171. 
273 See Caplan, Requests, Gifts, and Obligations, supra note 201, at 55. 
274 [d. 
275 R.D. Gutunann and A. Guttmann, Organ Transplantation: Duty Reconsidered, 24 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2179, 2179 (1992). 
276 See id. 
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The ethical debates concerning presumed consent will undoubt-
edly continue as long as the organ shortage continues. Both propo-
nents and opponents of presumed consent should obtain a full 
understanding of the effects this approach has had in countries 
where it has been enacted. Presumed consent does pose difficult 
legal and ethical hurdles, but they are not insurmountable. If 
France, Belgium, Austria, and Singapore truly have diminished their 
organ shortages through presumed consent, one cannot ignore the 
potential benefit of enacting more extensive presumed consent laws 
in the United States. 
D. Success of the French System 
For years after its inception, the Caillavet law produced disap-
pointing results regarding organ procurement.277 Finally, however, 
France is showing encouraging increases.278 Since its 1978 decree, 
France has regularly increased its annual number of transplanta-
tions.279 Recently, France has ranked among the top six European 
countries in number of postmortem donors per million of inhabi-
tants per year.280 It is unclear, however, from the available research, 
277In 1984, while almost 1,000 kidney transplants were performed in France, 3,000 people 
remained on the waiting list. See Gerson, supra note 111, at 1024-25. 
278 G. Benoit et aI., Presumed Consent Law: Results of its Application/Outcome From an 
Epidemiologic Survey, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 320, 320 (1990). 
279Kidneys: from 551 to 1808; hearts and heart/lungs: from 15 to 622; livers: from 7 to 409; 
and pancreas: from 2 to 43. Id. 
280 See Land & Cohen, supra note 141, at 2166. 
Austria 
(pure presumed consent) 
Madrid, Spain 
(presumed consent law in effect but 
not practiced) 
Catalania 
(presumed consent law in effect but 
not practiced) 
27 pmp/1989; 30 pmp/1990 
30.5 pmp/1990 
22.7 pmp/1990 
So. Bavaria 23.8 pmp/1989; 21.4 pmp/1990 
(no transplant law) 
Belgium 21.4 pmp/1989; 19.3 pmp/1990 
(presumed consent law enacted but 
physicians still request permission) 
France 19.2 pmp/1990 
(presumed consent law enacted but 
physicians still request permission) 
"The estimated number of donors from a specific region must be regarded with great caution 
because the estimated number of inhabitants in that region is not precisely known." Id. at 
2165. 
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whether France's recent improvements can justly be used to support 
the effectiveness of presumed consent, since the French system, as 
practiced, functions more like a voluntary system of organ procure-
ment than a system of presumed consent.281 This is because, despite 
the autonomy granted to physicians under the Caillavet law, French 
physicians notifY the deceased's family of their intention to remove 
organs in approximately 90.7 percent of cases.282 
Doctors disregard the law for a variety of reasons. Ethically, they 
may be opposed to ignoring the family's wishes, or fear they could 
be held legally liable for doing so. They may distrust the efficiency 
of the hospital's opting-out procedure or fear that the family has not 
affirmatively objected on behalf of the deceased because it is igno-
rant of its duty to do so. Finally, the doctor simply may not wish to 
spend time searching for objections on poorly maintained hospital 
charts.283 
In a study of 97 percent of Parisian hospitals, researchers found 
the following practices: strict application of the law-questioning of 
the family to determine solely the deceased's wishes (30.8 percent 
of the time); questioning of the family to determine only the wishes 
of the family, not the deceased (15.4 percent); questioning to deter-
mine both the family's and deceased's wishes (36 percent); and 
notification of the family without any questioning (18 percent). 284 In 
50 percent of the cases, the physicians elicited the family's wishes 
before taking any action regarding procurement of the deceased's 
organ(s) .285 This represents a significant departure from the in-
tended application of presumed consent.286 Inevitably, once the phy-
sician requests familial consent, the number of refusals significantly 
decreases the amount of organs harvested.287 
Some physicians justity their reluctance to exercise their rights 
under the French law because they feel that the opting-out mecha-
nisms are flawed and public awareness of the law is low. 288 Critics of 
the system point to the inadequacy of independent hospital objec-
tion registries. 289 Under the French system, there is no centralized 
281 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 16. 
282 Benoit, supra note 278, at 321. 
283 See Gerson, supra note Ill, at 1026. 
284 See Benoit, supra note 278, at 320-21. 
285 See id. at 321. 
286 [d. 
287 See Gerson, supra note 111, at 1025-26. 
288 See id. at 1026; see also Benoit, supra note 278, at 320. 
289 See Benoit, supra note 278, at 320. 
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national registry which documents the refusal of all French citizens. 
Therefore, citizens are unable to voice their objections before they 
are admitted to a hospital, and if seriously injured, are unable to do 
so when admitted to the hospital,290 To determine what correlation 
exists between its organ procurement totals and its law, further 
research must be done. 
E. Success in Belgium 
In Belgium, physicians deviate from a pure system of presumed 
consent and ask the deceased's family if it objects before removing 
organs.29! Despite this practice, Belgium's presumed consent law 
does appear to have greatly increased the number of organs pro-
cured and transplanted.292 A 1990 study found that, following the 
adoption of presumed consent, cadaveric kidney procurement had 
increased by 86 percent, total organ procurement by 183 percent, 
and total organs transplanted by 140 percent.293 A 1991 study re-
ported an increase of 119 percent for kidneys procured, and even 
greater increases for multi-organ procurement compared with the 
period preceding presumed consent legislation.294 
The significance of these improvements is currently debated.295 
Some scholars feel that Belgium's improvement rates are not attrib-
utable to its presumed consent law, but to an increase in the number 
of hospitals participating in the organ procurement process.296 
Other experts, however, feel that the increase in participating hos-
pitals is a direct result of the presumed consent legislation.297 They 
290 The Prime Minister, however, has stated that "persons who intend to refuse postmortem 
organ removal, have every liberty to announce or notifY their refusal." Land & Cohen, supra 
note 141, at 2165. 
291 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 16. 
292 See Roels, Effect of Presumed Consent, supra note 136, at 2078-79. 
293Id. 
294 L. Roels et aI., Three Years of Experience With a 'Presumed Consent' Legislation in Belgium: 
Its Impact on Multi-Organ Donation in Comparison With Other European Countries, 23 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 903, 903 (1991) [hereinafter Roels, Three Years]. 
Average number of kidneys, hearts, and livers harvested before the presumed consent law 
(1982-1985) and after the implementation in 1987 of a presumed consent law in Belgium: 
Id. 
kidneys 
hearts 
livers 
1982-1985 
187 
9 
7 
295 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at n.60. 
296Id. at 16. 
1987 
371 
77 
42 
297 See Roels, Three Years, supra note 294, at 904. 
1988 
377 
89 
66 
1989 
409 
118 
106 
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explain that prior to the legislation, many smaller non-university 
hospitals were reluctant to participate in organ procurement for fear 
of legal liability.298 Supporters of presumed consent are confident 
that Belgium can double the number of kidneys it presently pro-
cures within just a few years.299 To these experts, the improvements 
that Belgium has experienced prove that the problem of chronic 
organ shortage can be solved by enacting presumed consent legis-
lation.30o They feel that a system of presumed consent which allows 
ample opportunity to object or consent during one's lifetime "re-
spects maximally the individual's right of self-determination."301 
F. Success in Austria 
At first glance, the success of Austria's uncompromising presumed 
consent laws seems apparent. Austria has a higher rate of postmor-
tem organ donors than any other country as a whole. 302 Not only 
does Austria have a significantly higher rate of procured kidneys 
than (formerly West) Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, 
three countries similarly situated in terms of social and economic 
status, but it also rates 11 percent higher than Belgium.303 One can 
speculate that this superiority results from Austria's strict application 
of its law compared to Belgium's de facto system of encouraged 
voluntarism or required request.304 Austria, however, exhibits certain 
inconsistencies in its results. If Austria's high rates of procurement 
were due only to its presumed consent law, one would expect it to 
outpace other countries in all categories of organs covered by the 
law. This, however, is not the case. Austria rates only slightly higher 
than France or Belgium in livers procured, and rates lower in the 
number of hearts procured.305 Austria's high rates may derive more 
from its two very active transplant teams in Innsbruck and Vienna, 
which attract patients from outside of Austria, than from its system 
of presumed consent.306 Despite the correlation between Austria's 
increased organ donation rates and its legislation, its success war-
298 See Roels, Effect of Presumed Consent, supra note 136, at 2079. 
299 See Roels, Three Years, supra note 294, at 904. 
300 Id. 
301Id. 
302 See supra note 280 and accompanying text The only other statistics in Austria's range 
were those of the Madrid region of Spain, but these rates were not experienced in Spain as 
a whole. Land & Cohen, supra note 141, at 2166. 
303 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 17. 
304 See id. at 17-18. 
305 See id. at 18. 
306 See Land & Cohen, supra note 141, at 2166. 
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rants closer examination of the Austrian system. In particular, it 
could be instructive to determine what social factors cause Austrian 
doctors to respect the letter of the law and refrain from approaching 
families for consent, when physicians in so many other countries 
seem unwilling to remove an organ without familial consent. 307 
G. Success in Singapore 
Singapore's adoption of presumed consen t appears to have dimin-
ished its organ shortage significantly. Under its voluntary system of 
organ donation, between 1970 and 1987, only 4.7 kidneys were 
procured per year.308 This rate, however, escalated to an average of 
31.3 kidneys per year for the three years after the H OTA was enacted 
(1988-1990).309 Of the ninety-four kidneys procured from 1988 
through 1990, fifty-five (58.5 percent) of them were retrieved as a 
result of presumed consent, and thirty-nine (41.5 percent) were 
retrieved from donors who had opted-in.3lO The public education 
campaigns aimed at increasing acceptance of presumed consent also 
reaped great benefits for the voluntary program. Mter 1988, volun-
tary donations rose from 4.7 per year before 1988 to thirteen per 
year. 311 Much of the success of Singapore's law is attributed to the 
efforts of the National Kidney Foundation and the Ministry of 
Health which launched public education campaigns to educate the 
population on the need for organs and for support of the law.312 
There was also extensive professional and public debate conducted 
prior to the enactment of the law which heightened public aware-
ness.313 
Singapore's ethnic, racial, and religious diversity presents some 
particular challenges to the successful implementation of its organ 
donation policy. Muslims comprise roughly 16 percent of its three 
million inhabitants.314 Traditionally, Muslims have opposed organ 
307 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 18. 
30B See Soh & Lim, supra note 147, at 1337. In addition, between 1983 and 1987 Singapore 
was forced to import 33 kidneys from the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. See 
S.M.L. Lim et aI., Organ Donation In Singapare, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2179, 
2179 (1990). The survival rates of the imported kidneys were substantially lower than those 
retrieved domestically, probably due to the delays resulting from importation. See id. 
309Soh & Lim, supra note 147, at 1337. 
310Id. 
mId. 
312 See Iyer, supra note 146, at 133. 
313 See Soh & Lim, supra note 147, at 1337. 
314 Id. 
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donation.315 In 1983, the Muslim Religious Council reversed this 
position and sanctioned organ donation provided that Muslim do-
nors consent in advance in writing, that the organs of Muslim donors 
be transplanted immediately, and that the organs not be stored in 
organ banks.316 Given the limitations which still exist, and the large 
number of Muslims who still object, the HOTA excludes Muslims 
from its jurisdiction and alleviates their burden by allowing them, 
instead, to opt-in under the MTA.317 A Muslim who opts into the 
system may have his or her wishes vetoed by the family if its members 
personally object to donation.318 Ethical debate continues over the 
provision of the HOTA which stipulates that only those Muslims who 
have opted-into the system receive priority classification for receiv-
ing kidneys.319 Proponents of the HOTA's policy argue that individu-
als who do not wish to respond to the general needs of society 
cannot be allowed to reap its benefits later on.320 
Despite its success, Singapore has not eliminated its kidney short-
age completely-an estimated 310 patients still await kidney trans-
plants. 321 Singapore's small population and well-documented organ 
retrieval results make it an ideal country to examine when analyzing 
the feasibility of presumed consent. Singapore's success symbolizes 
the possibility of creating a functional, publicly accepted system of 
presumed consent. 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The encouraging results of presumed consent legislation abroad 
underscore the need to consider alternative policies in the United 
States. However immediate the need to improve our current system, 
the demands of a democratic society require that changes be pub-
licly supported by an informed electorate. One possible plan to 
accomplish these changes consists of an initial stage of education 
and assessments of existing organ procurement policies in this coun-
try and abroad, followed by a second stage of enactment of new 
legislation to deal more appropriately with the shortages than is 
accomplished by our current policies. 
315 See NKF Religi(fUS Views, supra note 184, at 35. 
316ld. 
317 See Iyer, supra note 146, at 135. 
318 See id. 
319 See id. 
320 See id. at 136-37. 
321 See Soh & Lim, supra note 147, at 1337. 
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A. The Initial Five Year Period 
During the first five years of the plan, efforts should focus on 
several major issues. The following areas are essential for positive 
change: 1) serious and widespread efforts to educate the public; 2) 
continuing efforts to train and educate the medical community; 3) 
implementation of increased means by which to register one's 
choice whether to donate; and 4) significant attempts to assess 
conclusively the results of major donation policies in the United 
States and abroad. 
l. Educating the Public 
Advocating increased public education is not a new concept. Al-
most every scholar of organ donation, regardless of his preferred 
policy, insists that public awareness of the need for organs and of 
the duty to choose whether or not to donate, are essential to the 
success of any donor program. Despite the difficulty of such a task, 
public perception will not change, and any legislation proposed will 
not succeed, if the transplant community cannot raise the public's 
awareness. First, citizens must recognize the need for transplantable 
organs, and acknowledge the number of U.S. citizens that suffer as 
a result of their indecision. The medical community must effectively 
communicate the procedural safeguards currently employed in de-
claring a patient dead. The public must understand that its fears of 
being left to die or having its organs removed prematurely are 
unfounded. 
Further, individuals must accept the necessity of informing their 
families about their wishes regarding donation. Under our current 
system of required request, since the family is almost always asked 
to consent even if the deceased has signed a valid donor card, it is 
imperative that the family know how strongly the deceased believed 
in donation. If, as is usually the case, the deceased has not affir-
matively consented to donation while alive, the family's decision 
whether to consent will be made less difficult if the family knows 
whether the deceased favored donation. Individuals should be mo-
tivated by the fact that informing their families can significantly 
decrease the stress their family will undoubtedly suffer upon the 
individual's death. 
Additionally, religious leaders must be entreated to educate their 
followers on their religion's position regarding donation and trans-
plantation. The leaders also should encourage their adherents to 
affirmatively choose an option based on their personal and religious 
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convictions. Lastly, citizens in states with modified presumed con-
sent legislation for corneal and pituitary removal by coroners, 
should be made aware that these laws currently exist and have not 
caused adverse societal consequences. 
2. Educating and Training the Medical Profession 
The initial five year period should also focus on continuing to 
educate and train the medical establishment to request consent 
effectively and comfortably, and to understand and recognize when 
brain death has occurred. Simultaneously, efforts should be made 
to enact brain death legislation in those states which still do not 
legally recognize brain death as death. 
3. Increasing Opportunities to Opt-In or Out 
Citizens should be given much broader opportunities to choose 
whether or not they wish to donate. It is socially desirable to have 
every citizen decide for herself-at a rational point in time, unbur-
dened by impending illness-whether she wishes to donate her 
organs. Citizens should be made to feel a greater duty to make a 
choice while alive. Legislation should be passed which requires citi-
zens to choose: 1) "yes" and if so, to specifY which organs; 2) "no," 
always having the opportunity to reconsider; or 3) "let my next-of-kin 
decide upon my death." This last option will protect those individu-
als who believe that the decision to donate is one which rightly 
belongs to the surviving family, not the deceased. 
Forms for registering one's choice could be made available on 
many occasions: when renewing one's driver's license; when regis-
tering with selective service; when registering to vote; when donating 
blood or sperm; or anytime one addresses matters of health or 
mortality-e.g., when buying health, life or car insurance, when 
applying for medicaid or medicare, when drafting wills or living 
wills, or when buying cemetery plots or arranging for cremation. 
4. Determining the Success of Other Systems 
Throughout this initial five year period, the scientific community 
should increase its efforts to conclusively assess the success of re-
quired request and routine inquiry legislation in all states that have 
these systems. Such studies should consider all relevant factors that 
affect donation results. Additionally, transplant scholars must obtain 
more specific and reliable data on other countries that follow some 
450 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVII, No, 2 
variation of presumed consent. These countries must be scrutinized 
to determine how their systems work in practice, not just in theory. 
Only by analyzing these systems closely will we gain a sufficient 
understanding of what changes must be implemented in the United 
States. 
B. The Second Phase-Legislation 
At the end of five years, legislation should be enacted that requires 
citizens to choose one of the "yes," "no," or "next-of-kin" donation 
options. If efforts during the first phase of the plan are successful 
by this time, the majority of the population will have already volun-
tarily registered its choice with the state. Eligibility for a variety of 
government services can be conditioned on having registered. It is 
time that individuals accept the burden of making an affirmative 
decision regarding organ donation. The needless consequences of 
their inaction, thousands of deaths each year, justify imposing such 
a burden on the members of society. 
During this second stage, assuming that substantial organ short-
ages still exist, legislators should enact a modified system of pre-
sumed consent, one requiring "reasonable efforts." These reason-
able effort laws would function essentially like those currently 
enacted in some states, but would apply not only to coroners and 
medical examiners but to all hospital transplant professionals. The 
laws would cover all organs, rather than the limited array of organs 
covered in most of the existing "reasonable effort" laws. The laws 
should require that a reasonable effort be made to inquire whether 
the family objects to the routine removal of organs, not to inquire 
if the family affirmatively consents. While this may seem an insig-
nificant distinction, it may be less emotionally burdensome for griev-
ing family members to exercise their right to object, than it would 
be to force them to affirmatively choose to donate if they had never 
contemplated the decision.322 
Since legislation requiring individuals to choose an option while 
alive would be enacted in the initial stage of the plan, this reasonable 
effort law would only apply to the limited situations where, despite 
the law, the individual had not registered her choice or where the 
322 This is essentially the argument made by Matas in his 1985 article in which he advocates 
a system of "routine removal with right to informed refusal." See Matas, supra note 171, at 
238. 
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individual had opted to let her family decide. Mandating that a 
reasonable effort be made by hospital personnel would not add to 
the burden that our current system of required request already 
imposes on the professional responsible for requesting consent or 
informing the family of its options. If, as a result of the educational 
efforts proposed in the initial stage of the plan, individuals began 
to accept that they have a duty to decide for themselves while alive, 
an expansive reasonable effort law would be much more acceptable 
to the public than it may be now. In order to respect autonomy, the 
system should honor the explicit, registered wishes of the deceased 
over those of the family. This means that, if the deceased had 
consented while alive, the hospital would have no duty to ask the 
family if it objected. In the event that a donor had explicitly con-
sented to donate, the hospital simply would be required to inform 
the family that it was proceeding with removal since it was required 
by state law to respect the deceased's wishes. Conversely, if the 
deceased had explicitly refused donation, the hospital would not be 
allowed to ask the family to override those wishes either. 
Under our current system, each year thousands of adults and 
children awaiting organs sit idly by, hoping that somewhere an 
individual has been sufficiently moved by the spirit of generosity to 
grant that his organ, or that of a loved one, be used to save the life 
of an unfortunate donee. The injustice of a system that allows, or 
indeed requires, this type of behavior justifies an immediate change 
in organ donation policy. Organ transplantation is one of the few 
areas of medical science in which the major barriers to resolving the 
medical crisis are not due to a lack of scientific or technological 
know-how. Society has a duty to take whatever steps are necessary-
as long as they are legally, ethically, and morally acceptable-to 
eradicate the organ shortage, especially since it already has the 
capability to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has a long history of actively encouraging 
posthumous organ donation for transplantation. The medical com-
munity, and in turn the legislature, has adapted its approach to 
organ donation over the years in order to procure greater numbers 
of organs. In doing so, they have always endeavored to protect the 
rights of individuals. The time has come to reevaluate the systems 
of required request and routine inquiry currently employed in the 
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United States .. Critical to this evaluation is an appreciation of pre-
sumed consent laws presently in force around the world. The in-
creases in organ procurement experienced by countries such as 
France, Belgium, Austria, and Singapore can prove instructive in 
modeling a presumed consent approach to organ donation in the 
United States. 
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